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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
RAEGEN DANIELLE FRANCIS,
individually and as the
Personal Representative of
the Estate of Edward
Kenneth Francis, Jr., deceased,
Court of Appeals No. 970651-CA
(Oral Argument Requested)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 15

EDWARD K. FRANCIS, SR., and
PATRICIA BLUNDON FRANCIS,
Defendants and Appellants. 1

Summary of Argument and Standard of Review
There are five issues on appeal:
1.

Was any behavior by Defendants preceding or following the
suicide of their son sufficiently outrageous to support an
award of damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

2.

Was any behavior on the part of the Defendants done
intentionally and for the purpose of causing harm to
Plaintiff or the proximate cause Plaintiff's severe
emotional distress.

3.

Can an award of damages for conversion be sustained absent
evidence of fair market value.
|L

4.

Can an award of damages for conversion be sustained absent
evidence of a demand for the return of the allegedly
converted property?

5.

Were the trial court's findings of fact relative to the
values of the allegedly converted property clearly
erroneous?
As to the issues which are mixed questions of law and fact,

subordinate findings of fact are reviewed under the "clearly
erroneous" standard while the ultimate conclusions as well as the
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness.
869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena,

Challenges to the findings of

fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard.

Alta

Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993).
In challenging facts, the Appellant must marshal the
evidence, assembling the facts in support

of the judgment, and

then, in light of such facts, demonstrate that there is some
fatal flaw in the evidence.

Oneida/SLC v. Oneida Cold Storage

and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-52 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In the present case, the evidence has been marshaled.

It is set

forth in the Opening Brief in fastitious and exhaustive detail.
Plaintiff concedes as much.

Plaintiff's/Appellee's Brief 2.

The evidence adduced in this case has several fatal flaws.
There is no evidence of causation or intent to harm or purpose to
inflict emotional distress by Plaintiffs.

2

There was a complete

failure of evidence on this point and the trial court's decision
is devoid of any reference to these points.

Similarly, a review

of the evidence fails to disclose single act by Defendants, or a
any series of acts by Defendants, which can reasonably be called
extreme or outrageous.

There was a failure of proof of fair

market value of the property Plaintiff claims was converted;
instead, the only evidence of value was her uninformed,
unsupported opinion.

Finally, there was no evidence that any

demand was made, which is a necessary prerequisite to suit for
conversion in a case such as this.

Accordingly, the judgment

should be reversed.

Reply Argument
I.

Judgment Should be Reversed As There was a Complete Failure
of Proof of Causation
Proof of proximate causation is essential to Plaintiff's

claim.

She has failed in this proof.

A review of the judge's

decision, which includes the judge's determinations of fact,
fails to reveal any finding of causation.1

The evidence is clear

1. At several points in her brief, Plaintiff confuses the
particular issue at hand by discussing her emotional distress
rather than causation or intent. Appellee's Brief 9-10, 12.
Causation, intent, and severe emotional distress are each
distinct elements and proof of one does not excuse proof of any
other.
It should be noted that there has never been any dispute
that Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. She clearly
did. The fact has always been that Defendant did not act
intentionally to cause her distress or in any way outrageously.
3

that the actual and proximate cause of Plaintiff's emotional
distress was finding her deceased husband's body.
Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, M

20-22.

Proximate cause is "that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, (unbroken by efficient intervening cause),
produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.

It is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily

sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury."
Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

In

the present case, the natural cause, the caused which produced
Plaintiff's injury was the suicide of her husband and her own
guilt over precipitating that tragedy.
The medical records, which Plaintiff introduced, amply
demonstrate that it was finding Little Ed's body and the
associated trauma with his suicide was the cause of her distress.
Plaintiff now attempts to point to other events —events not
considered by the trial court— to bolster her non-existant proof
of causation.

She now claims that she was "assaulted" on 16

March 1994 and that such "assault" caused her to be
hospitalized.2

Curiously, she did not assert any claim for

Plaintiff herself concedes that at most, Defendants' acts were
only a cause (i.e., one of several) of distress not the sole
cause. Appellee's Brief 11 (emphasis added). Conceding this
point heightens the need for specific evidence of causation.
Having failed to adduce such evidence, the judgment cannot stand.
2. Plaintiff claims she was briefly hospitalized by her
obstetrician on the day of this confrontation, 16 March 1995.
4

assault in her complaint nor did the trial court make any such
finding nor even a reference to such an altercation.
The only statement of the trial court which could reasonably
be considered as even close to a finding of causation is the bald
and unsupported statement that "Plaintiff suffered emotional
distress at the hands of the defendants,"
15.

Trial Court Decision

This statement appears in the court's "analysis" section

rather than the section the court entitled "facts." Even if this
conclusory statement is viewed as a finding of fact, rather than
part of the trial court's analysis, there are no subsidiary facts
found which lend the necessary factual support and the court made
no such factual finding.

The reason is simple:

there are no

facts which could lead a reasonable finder of fact, properly
focused on the issue of causation, to conclude that the
Defendants caused Plaintiff7s emotional distress.
"'Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was

Trial Transcript 78. She makes this claim repeatedly in her
appellate brief. Appellee's Brief 4-5, 8-9, 11, 12. However a
review of Plaintiff's medical records, which were introduced as
exhibits at trial reveals no such hospitalization. To the
contrary, there is a billing record only for 14 March 1994 for
some miscellaneous lab work. See Trial Exhibit 10, attached
hereto as Appendix A. This admission followed an admission in
February and preceded the admission on 18 March 1994, when she
found her husband. Plaintiff's testimony is belied by her own
medical records; there was no hospitalization or admission on 16
March 1994.
5

reached."'" Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638-39 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995), quoting. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993), quoting Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

In this case, there are no such findings on the

critical issue of outrageousness.
The Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress when she
found her dead husband, not before.

Defendants'/Appellants'

Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, 11 20-22.

In addition,

Plaintiff fails to recognize her own role in these sorrowful
events.

She told the Decedent that her unborn child was not his.

She testified that her purpose in so doing was to upset Little
Ed.

Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, Statement of Facts 1

9.

Her own psychologist testified that such a statement could be

extremely upsetting to Little Ed.

Ld. 1 35.

Most importantly,

Plaintiff's own medical records demonstrate that she herself
believed she played a role in this tragedy:

"The client is

blaming herself for the suicide stating that she and her husband
had separated 36 hours earlier."

id. SI 33.

There was a complete failure of proof that Defendants caused
Plaintiff's severe emotional distress.

The trial court made no

such finding and the Defendant has pointed to no evidence in the
record which demontrates that Defendants were the natural cause
of Plaintiff's suffering. There is none to be found in this case.
The judgment should be reversed.

6

II.

Judgment Ought To Be Reversed As There Was No Evidence of
Intent to Harm
It is also necessary, in order to sustain a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, to prove intent.
There was a total failure of evidence on this point as well.
Like causation, the trial court failed to make any findings,
ultimate or subordinate, that any actions of the Defendant were
for the intent of causing Plaintiff any kind of distress
whatsoever.
The uniform, and oft-cited rule, is that Defendants must
have acted intentionally and with the purpose of causing severe
Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d

emotional distress to Plaintiff.

685,

687-88 (Utah 1996); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d
896, 905 (Utah 1992); Larsen v. Svsco Corp., 767 P.2d 557, 560
(Utah 1989); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1961).
This formulation, imposes a dual intent requirement:

First, the

actor must act intentionally or with recklessness in taking
action.

Put another way, the actor must act with volition

intending the act and the consequences of the act or with
reckless disregard for the foreseeable results of the actions.
Second, the actor must take such intentional or reckless act with
the purpose in mind of causing emotional distress to the
plaintiff.

Id.

Thus, Plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to convince
a finder of fact that Defendants acted intentionally and with the
7

purpose of causing her distress.

In the present case, there is

not a single piece of evidence, nor a single finding of fact of a
general or specific nature, which would support a finding that
Defendants ever took any action for the purpose of inflicting
emotional distress upon Plaintiff.
The facts, as pointed out in the opening brief, demonstrate
the precise moment Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress:
when she found her husband's body.

Defendants'/Appellants'

Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, M

20-22.

She called

Defendants, in accordance with Little Ed's suicide note and was
whisked off to the hospital before the Defendants arrived.

Id.

Every subsequent hospitalization noted that it was this event
which was the cause of her distress.3

Id. See also,

3. The Restatement of Torts contains an illustration
somewhat similar to this case:
During A's absence from her home, B attempts to commit
suicide in A's kitchen by cutting his throat. B knows
that A is substantially certain to return and find his
body, and to suffer emotional distress. A finds B
lying in her kitchen in a pool of gore, and suffers
severe emotional distress. B is subject to liability
to A.
§ 46, ill. 15. In the present case, then,
Plaintiff may have had a cause of action against her husband.
This serves to illustrate, however, Plaintiff's own role in
this tragedy. On 16 March 1995, Plaintiff publically shouted at
Little Ed, a mildly physically disabled person, that her child
was not his. This comment, coming on the heals of their decision
to divorce, was taken hard and likely played a significant role
in Little Ed's decision to commit suicide.
Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, Statement of Facts f 35.
Plaintiff herself testified that her purpose in making this
sordid comment was to upset Little Ed. Xd. 1 9.
RESTATEMENT, 2D, TORTS

8

Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, Appendix D (Plaintiff's
hospital records).
In response to this, Plaintiff weakly asserts —without
factual or legal underpinning—

that "[i]t would be ludicrous to

believe that they did not intend to harm plaintiff."
Plaintiff's/Appellee's Brief 13.

In order to prevail, Plaintiff

was required to provide evidence more substantial than her
evanescent conjecture that the actions of the Defendant were
undertaken for the purpose of inflicting harm on her.

This

evidence should have been embodied in the trial court's formal
findings.

Neither was done.

In the portion of the trial court's ruling setting forth the
facts, there is no fact which relates to intent or purpose or
which could reasonably sustain such a finding.

Equally

important, Plaintiff points to no evidence, no testimony, no
proof to attempt to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the failure
to address the issue in the decision, the trial court
nevertheless had such evidence before it.

She points to none

because there is none.
This is not a case in which the Appellee claims that the
evidence has not been properly marshaled.

To the contrary, she

concedes that the Appellant's statement of facts was detailed and
indicated her general agreement.

Having ferreted out the facts,

there is simply no evidence of Defendants intent or purpose.
Given the total failure of proof on this point, the trial court's
9

award of damages cannot be sustained.

Intent and purpose to

inflict emotional harm are fundamental elements of the tort;
absent these elements, no tort has been committed and Defendants
are not subject to liability to Plaintiff.

There being no such

evidence, the trial court's award of damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress must be reversed.

Ill. Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Absent a Determinatin of
Outrageousness
Thedegree of "outrageousness" required before an act is
sufficient to sustain a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is measured objectively.
Retherford v. AT&T, 842 P.2d 949, 976 n.17 (Utah 1992).

As noted

in the opening brief, only atrocious, extraordinarily vile
conduct satisfies this standard.
Brief 26-27.

Defendants'/Appellants' Opening

In this case, that objective standard cannot fairly

be said to have been met.
The trial court appears to have decided that Defendants did
three things which were extreme and outrageous.

First, they

"excluded plaintiff from the planning and execution of the
funeral."

Second, "they took control of her property and did

with it as they pleased."

Third, "they denied her any

recognition as the decedent's spouse."
15.

Trial Court's Decision

Under the rather extreme circumstances of this case, none of

these items rises to the level of outrageousness required.
10

These

conclusions are flawed for two reasons.

the underlying facts do

not support these ultimate conclusions and, taking these facts in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, there has been no
outrageous and extreme conduct.
The trial court concluded that Defendant's excluded
Plaintiff from planning and control of the funeral.

The evidence

is that, Defendants and their attorney spoke with Plaintiff about
the funeral and gave her the opportunity to handle all of the
arrangements for Little Ed's funeral, provided she paid for such
arrangements.

She rejected this proposal and gave Defendants

permission to proceed with the funeral.

It must be remembered

that Plaintiff left the suicide scene before Defendants arrived
and was admitted later that morning to the hospital in a nearly
hysterical state.

Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief,

Statement of Facts 1 22.

Plaintiff was not released from the

hospital until after the funeral,

id.

There was absolutely no

suggestion or evidence of any kind that the funeral was timed to
prevent Plaintiff's attendance.

These acts cannot be said to be

outrageous.
The trial court also wrote that Defendants took control of
Plaintiff's property and did with it as they pleased.

However

Plaintiff and her parents took several car loads of property out
of the house on 16 March 1995. Defendants'/ Appellants' Opening
Brief, Statement of Facts SI 8.
and they intended to divorce.

She had separated from Little Ed
Defendants'/Appellants' Opening
11

Brief, Statement of Facts M
in the house.

11, 13.

She had no further interest

Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief, Statement

of Facts 1 4/ Trial Transcript 8-10

(Plaintiff's counsel formally

relinquishes any interest in the home).

Defendants may have made

a poor legal judgment in assuming that their deceased son's
estate would be theirs rather than his estranged wife.

This may

be legally incorrect, but it is neither extreme nor outrageous.
It is also difficult to believe that Plaintiff was so severely
emotionally distraught at being separated from the property that,
even after retaining an attorney she never demanded the return of
her property.

This behavior is certainly not so utterly

atrocious that no civilized society can tolerate it.

Civilized

society tolerates mistakes of judgement.
Finally, the trial court concluded that Defendants denied
Plaintiff recognition as the decedent's spouse.

This apparently

stems from the fact that she was not mentioned in the obituary in
the Salina Sun or in the funeral program.4

Defendants had been

4. The trial court entirely misunderstood and misstated the
evidence relating to the obituaries. The first obituary was
published in the Salina Sun under the direction of the funeral
home director. It made no mention of the Plaintiff. She was
upset when she discovered this, went to the director and
prevailed upon him to correct this situation.
Defendants'/Appellant's Opening Brief, Statement of Facts 1 24;
Trial Transcript 94-95.
The second obituary was prepared by Little Ed's sister,
Teresa, who is not a party to this action. She prepared it about
a month later and had it published in the Provo Herald to give
Little Ed's friends in Payson notice of his death. Again, it
made no notice of Plaintiff. However, the fact that the court
ignored was that this notice was not published by the funeral
12

told by Little Ed that the marriage was over and that he and
Plaintiff would divorce.
them and Plaintiff.

There were very bitter feelings between

Defendant Ed Francis told the funeral

director that Little Ed and Plaintiff were divorced.

Under the

circumstances, this is not outrageous and indeed, separating
Plaintiff from Little Ed's family may have been a very good idea
given the events of the prior week.

There is no rule of

compelled speech imposed by law or under threat of damages.

This

cannot constitute outrageous behavior.
The first paragraph of Section 46, comment d of the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, 2 D ,

h a s o f t e n b e e n r e c i t e d by U t a h c o u r t s

in

describing the nature of conduct necessary to constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The second

paragraph has not been cited, but is instructive:
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppresions, or
other trivialities. The rough edges of our society [or
perhaps our nature] are still in need of a good deal of
filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to
a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional
home director nor by the Defendants. The undisputed testimony
—evidence not disputed by Plaintiff her brief before this courtis that the Provo Herald notice was prepared and paid for by
Little Ed's sister Teresa. The Defendants had no role, directly
or indirectly, in that notice. Id.
The trial court simply misunderstood this evidence. There
was no other evidence on this point presented, so it was not a
matter of believing some evidence and necessarily rejecting other
evidence. The trial court was simply wrong. Trial Court's
Decision M 31-32, at 7. Certainly, as a matter of law, it is
not outrageous to play no role in the publication of the Provo
Herald obituary.
13

acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.
There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every
case where someone's feelings are hurt. There must
still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion,
and some safety valve must be left through which
irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless
steam.
RESTATEMENT, 2D, TORTS

§ 46, cmt. d. P l a i n t i f f ,

Defendants,

Little

Ed, and Plaintiff's parents were all involved in an unseemly
confrontation two days before Little Ed's suicide.

Yelling,

unkind words, physical altercations, breaking the furniture,
police intervention, and allegations of adultery and lack of
paternity and related implications of unmanliness were the order
of the day.5

Liability does not extend to mere insults,

indignities, threats, annoyances, or petty oppresions.
Plaintiff has not suggested that Defendants have failed to
marshal or otherwise place the facts supporting the judgment
fairly before the Court.

Upon reviewing the facts found by the

trial court, outrage and resentment are not aroused, merely pity.
Like Plaintiff's causation and intent failures, this point fails
as well.

Plaintiff lost her husband to a tragic suicide.

played a role in the events leading to this suicide.
lost their youngest son to the same tragic suicide.
neither findings nor evidence to support this point.
judgment should therefore be reversed.

5. See footnote 2, supra.
14

She

Defendants
There were
The

IV.

Absent Any Demand, There Could Be No Conversion
Under many circumstances, a demand is required to complete a

cause of action for conversion.
circumstance.

This case presents such a

Plaintiff packed her things and left Little Ed two

days prior to his suicide.
loads of material.

She took several car and pick-up

Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief,

Statement of Facts 11 8, 11, 13.

Little Ed told his parents the

marriage was over and that they would be divorcing.
Little Ed shot himself on 18 March 1994.
Plaintiff, who called Defendants.
before Defendants arrived.
least a week.

He was found by

She had left the premises

She was then in the hospital for at

After she was released, she went to the house and

peered in the windows.

Property was still there.

nothing; she did not speak to Defendants.

She did

Defendants'/

Appellants' Opening Brief, Statement of Facts SIS! 19-22.
Plaintiff had available legal processes to force the return
of property to her as the personal representative of the estate.
See, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-708 (1993).6
6.

Given the circumstances

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-708 (1993) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by a decedentfs
will, every personal representative has a right
to, and shall take possession or control of, the
decedent's property, except that any real property
or tangible personal property may be left with or
surrendered to the person presumptively entitled
thereto unless or until, in the judgment of the
personal representative, possession of the
property by him will be necessary for purposes of
administration. The request by a personal
representative for delivery of any property
15

of this case, Plaintiff was under a duty to make some sort of
demand of the Defendants for the return of property she claims
was hers or the estate's.

Conversion is not merely the wrongful

possession of an item, it is the wrongful possession coupled with
a denial of the owner's title.
102 (Utah 1934).

Christensen v. Pugh, 36 P.2d 100,

If there is never a demand, as Plaintiff

concedes, there is never a denial of title and therefore, never a
conversion.

Accordingly, Defendants have not converted

Plaintiff's property and the trial court's judgment was
erroneous.

V.

It should be reversed.

As the Only Evidence of Value Presented by Plaintiff Was Her
Own Incompetant and Immaterial Opinion, She Cannot Recover
Damages for Conversion
Plaintiff also failed to satisfy her burden of proof of

damages for conversion.

Her evidence was entirely unsatisfactory

and the court erred, as a matter of law and fact, in accepting it
and basing an award of damages upon such evidence.7
possessed by an heir or devisee is conclusive
evidence, in any action against the heir or
devisee for possession thereof, that the
possession of the property by the personal
representative is necessary for purposes of
administration. The personal representative shall
pay taxes on, and take all steps reasonably
necessary for the management, protection, and
preservation of, the estate in his possession. He
may maintain an action to recover possession of
property or to determine the title thereto.
7. Plaintiff makes a very clever ploy to confuse the court
and conflate her conversion claim and her intentional infliction
16

Plaintiff readily concedes that her evidence was based, in
certain instances, upon the cost of the particular item and in
other instances, upon her opinion as to value.
15-16.

Appellee's Brief

Proof of market value, rather than cost or opinion of

worth, is the proper measure of damages for conversion.
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1993);
Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1961).
evidence, a claim for conversion will not lie.

Without such
Lowe at 421; Lym

v. Tompson, 184 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1947).
Citing to an ALR annotation, Plaintiff claims that in
certain cases, court have accepted an alternative evidentiary
means of assessing and proving value for converted goods.
Plaintiff's Brief 13; Brendan de R. 0'Byrne, Annotation,
Valuation of Wearing Apparel or Household Goods Kept By Owner for
Personal Use, In Action for Loss or Conversion Of, or Injury To,
Such Property, 34 A.L.R.3d 816 (1970).

She claims that the

courts will sustain a finding for her based upon proof of "value
to the owner/'

Id. at 13.

Plaintiff cites the three Utah cases

referred to in the ALR annotation in support of her claim:

of emotional distress claim. She cites to several cases allowing
damages for psychic disturbance in cases of wrongful eviction.
Appellee's Brief 10. This is improper. She has never claimed to
be entitled to psychic distress damages for a wrongful eviction
and no such eviction has been claim or occurred. Plaintiff
herself abandoned the premises in Sigurd and had no further
interest in that home. Her counsel admitted this at the
commencement of trial when he stipulated to an order, on his own
motion, releasing the lis pendens on the house. Trial Transcript
9-11.
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Haycraft v. Adams, 24 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1933); Pennington v.Redman
Van & Storage Co.,

97 P. 115 (Utah 1908); and

Smith v. Mine &

Smelter Supply Co., 88 P. 683 (Utah 1907).
These cases discredit rather than sustain Plaintiff's
position:
Cost of an article, as indicated by the trial court,
may be one way, or one of the factors that may be used
in a proper case, of getting at the question of market

value; but,
evidence.

standing
*

alone,

It Is not
*

competent
*

As heretofore indicated, special cases an
exceptional circumstances permit the allowance of a
witness to testify s to the cost or price paid or
reproduction value of the thing as a starting
point}
but, unless this is connected by some competent
evidence that brings the cost or purchase price into
relation with the market value except in certain cases
of total loss or destruction of property, the evidence
of cost or purchase price becomes incompetent and
immaterial.
Haycraft, 24 P.2d at 1112 (emphasis added).

The Haycraft court

then specifically discusses both Pennington and Smith.

While

purchase price or replacement price may be a starting point for
assessing value, by itself it is insufficient, "incompetent and
immaterial" in the words of Haycraft.

Ld.

There must be

additional evidence tending to show the lack of a market,
condition, age, and use.
In the present case, there is no evidence as to any of these
items.

On items where a purchase price was stated, that was the

full extent of the evidence offered.
250-76.

Trial Transcript, 176-216,

No evidence of age, condition, marketability, or use was
18

ever offered.

As to other items, Plaintiff offered her own

unsubstantiated and useless opinion.

id.

There was no competent

evidence of damages given.
Plaintiff's argument on this point contains a paragraph that
is both illustrative and fatuous.

She writes:

Ten guns were involved. Plaintiff expressed the
opinion that the guns had a value of $400 each. Defendants
contested this evidence. The court awarded $2,000 for the
guns which would give them an average value of $200 each.
The evidence indicated a value of $400 for at least two of
the guns (a hand gun purchased by Mr. Francis from Little
Ed, and a rifle sold to Juan Larsen).
Appellee's Brief 15.

The evidence presented was that the handgun

purchase by Defendant Edward Francis for $400 occurred months
before Little Ed's suicide.

It was not one of the guns in the

house at the time of his death.
Brief 38 n.28.
was sold.

Defendants'/Appellants' Opening

Indeed, Plaintiff herself recognized that the gun

If it was sold to Defendants, how could it have

possibly been converted by them months later?

Similarly, the

undisputed evidence was that the rifle sold to Juan Larsen was a
rifle which belonged to the Defendants son-in-law, John Orr,
which Defendant Ed Francis sold at his request.
belonged in any sense to Little Ed.

It never

How was it converted?

This

portion of Plaintiff's argument is entirely disingenous, as
demonstrated in Defendants'/Appellants' Opening Brief 38 n.28.
Plaintiff's real point in these two pieces of evidence was
not to establish particular items of converted property, but to
try to lend some degree of credibility to her own preposterous
19

testimony regarding value.

She claimed that it was well known

that any gun has an average value of $400.

As the foundation for

this proposition, she indicated that she knew absolutely nothing
about guns.

She had never purchased one, sold one, or been

present during a purchase.8
The same quality of testimony continued for several other
items of property.

For example, even the trial court could not

credit her testimony regarding a camera.
Trial Transcript 199-200.

See Decision 13-14;

She claimed it was worth $2,500, but

could provide no evidence as to model, make, type, or any other

8. Plaintiff testified at trial, on cross-examination as
follows:
Q:
[by Mr. Kunz] Do you know what guns they were?
A:
[by Plaintiff] I don't know nothing about guns, so I
could not tell you.
Q;
An so you have — t h e only--how do you base then—if you
don't know anything about guns, how do you base the
value of $4,000 that you claim for the ten guns?
x
A:
Cause four thous--$400 is an average of how much you
would pay for a gun.
Q:
So you're saying that you are just assuming then that-that the ten guns had a value of $400 each; is that
correct?
A:
That is correct.
Q:
But where do you get the $4 00?
A:
That is prob--an average tht you can get for a gun, a
newer gun or any gun, that is how much you would pay to
get a gun.
Q:
Have you ever bought a gun?
A:
No. I have not.
Q:
Have you ever sold a gun?
A:
No. I have not.
Q:
Have you ever been present when anybody bought a gun?
A:
Not that I can remember, no.
Trial Transcript, 274-75. Given this testimony, it is difficult
to understand the trial court's award of any damages for
conversion of any gun.
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pertinent information.

Id.

Her opinions of value range on items

as diverse as CB radios, barbecues, children's toys, rocking
chairs, vacuums, oil lamps, and even an old automatic coal feeder
called a stokermatic.

Trial Transcript, 176-216, 250-76. Her

opinion as to cost or even value of these items, standing alone,
does not suffice to prove value.9

The trial court's findings in

this regard were clearly erroneous.

The judgment should

therefore be reversed.

Request for Hearing and Fully Reasoned Decision
Given the factual complexity and legal significance of this
case as well as the age of certain precedents and the relative
sparsity of case law, Appellants request oral argument and a
fully reasoned opinion in this matter.

Conclusion

9. Plaintiff relies on a series of contract cases to
establish the proposition that once the fact of damage is proven,
the amount of damage may be proven somewhat less stringently.
She claims that arithmetical precision is not required.
Appellee's Brief 17. While Appellants do not necessarily concede
that these cases state the law applicable to this case, even
accepting their principles as correct avails the Plaintiff
nothing. The point of this portion of the appeal is not that
Plaintiff's damages are a little fuzzy or imprecise, it is that
there is no competent evidence from which one can deduce the
amount of damages without simply accepting pure guesswork and
speculation in lieu of proper proof.
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Plaintiff failed to present any evidence of causation or
intent and purpose to inflict harm on her claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

The trial court failed to make

any findings relating to these matters.

The judgment cannot

therefore be sustained and ought to be reversed.

Plaintiff

failed to make any demand for property she believed to be hers
prior to initiating this action, which was a prerequisite to
suit.

Finally, Plaintiff has presented no competent evidence

sufficient to sustain her judgment for conversion.

Accordingly,

the judgment should be reversed in its entirety.
DATED thisJ^f day of April, 1998.
Stevenson & Smith, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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Exhibit A

MEDICAID
BOX 1 6 5 3 0
SALT LAKE C I T Y , 1JT
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PATIENT NO' 4
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THANK YOU
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->
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